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Does the CFTC Commitments of Traders Report Contain Useful Information?
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Commitments of Traders data are examined.
Non-commercial  positions are thought to contain the least amount of measurement error.
Although non-commercials comprise a relatively small percent of the tested markets’ open
interest (10% to 22%), they have the most volatile net positions.  The data demonstrates a
statistically (positive) negative contemporaneous correlation between net positions held by (non)
commercials and market returns.  However, traders’ net positions do not lead (Granger cause)
market returns.  In fact, returns lead traders’ net positions.  Positive returns result in an
(increase) decrease in (non) commercials net positions the following week.  The findings suggest
that prior empirical results, which make assumptions about traders’ positions not changing over
a reporting interval, may be biased toward reflecting the contemporaneous position-return
correlations reported in this research.
Keywords:  Commitments of Traders, commercial traders, non-commercial traders, funds
‘The only real bullish factor in the market is that funds have gotten themselves very short, so inevitably
locals will try to push the market higher’ (Anonymus Trader, Wall Street Journal).
In order for prices to continue higher, there must be strong buying support and according to the latest
Commitments of Traders report, that may be difficult for at least one segment of the market.  According to
the CFTC, non-commercials [funds] have increased their net longs…to near record levels  (NGI’s Daily
Gas Price Index).
Introduction
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) collects data on the composition of open
interest for all futures contracts.  A subset of this data is released to the public in the CFTC’s
Commitments of Traders (COT) report.  The open interest is divided into reporting and non-
reporting traders, where reporting traders hold positions in excess of CFTC reporting levels.
Reporting traders are further categorized as commercials or non-commercials.  Commercials are
associated with an underlying cash-related business and they are commonly considered to be
hedgers.  Non-commercials are not involved in an underlying cash business; thus, they are
referred to as speculators.  Furthermore, reporting level non-commercial activity is generally
considered to be that of managed futures or commodity funds.  The non-reporting trader
classification is typically thought to reflect the activity of small speculators.  The COT data is
broadly discussed in terms of “hedgers” (reporting commercials), “funds” (reporting non-
commercials), and “small speculators” (non-reporting traders).  The problem addressed in this
research is whether or not these categorizations accurately describe the data, based on the
CFTC’s definitions and collection methodology.  For instance, are non-reporting traders “small
speculators”?  Furthermore, does the COT data provide potentially useful information to
academics and market analysts?
The CFTC’s COT report is widely anticipated and closely analyzed by commodity futures
traders.  The trade’s focus tends to be on the positions held by reporting non-commercials or3
“funds.”  On one hand, some analysts suggest that anticipatory purchases in front of commodity
funds are a profitable strategy.  On the other hand, it is proposed that relatively large fund
positions portend market reversals; thus, fund activity is a contrary indicator.  Others argue that
following the commercial trade is a profitable strategy (Welling).  Regardless of the supposition,
it is rarely supported by statistical evidence.
The COT data is also used by academics to examine the flow-of-funds among trader groups, the
forecasting ability of traders (Hartzmark; Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu), and the existence of risk
premia (Catrath, Liang, and Song).  Yet, the source, reliability, and definitions underlying the
data set are rarely scrutinized.  Given the widespread use of this data in both academics and
industry, it is essential that users have a thorough understanding of how the COT report is
compiled and what information it contains.  The following research examines these issues.  The
results are important to academics for correctly interpreting empirical tests of theoretical models
and to practitioners who must evaluate the data’s importance relative to a much broader
information set.
The research is divided into two general parts: 1) an analysis of the data collection procedures
used by the CFTC, and 2) an evaluation of the systematic relationship between the data and price
behavior.  The first issue is addressed by carefully going through the collection procedures
utilized by the CFTC to gain a better understanding of the data.  In particular, the data pose
numerous questions.  How have changes in reporting levels, speculative limits, and category
definitions impacted it through time?   What is the exact definition of a “trader”?  How are
option positions incorporated into the data?  What precisely defines a commercial versus a non-
commercial, and who determines that distinction?  It is important that researchers understand
these issues, or they risk misinterpreting their empirical results.  In this research we begin to
address these questions, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the COT data.
The second part of the research examines the informational content of the data as related to
prices.  This is not meant to be a test of market efficiency or trading profitability; rather, we are
investigating the informational content of the data in a broad sense.  How do traders’ positions
relate to prices?  Does the COT data contain information about price movement?  These
objectives are pursued in a general Granger causality framework for a subset of the livestock,
grain, and energy markets.  The results are particularly important to traders and analysts who
must allocate their resources across a large universe of data.
In summary, the CFTC’s COT data is widely used in both academia and the trade, but it is not
always well documented or understood.  The broad objective of this research is to further our
understanding of this unique data source.  In doing so, we will gain a more complete picture of
the data’s potential applicability and how to interpret empirical results that utilize it.
Literature Review
Academic use of the COT data has focused on three closely related veins of research: 1) the level
and adequacy of speculation in futures markets; 2) the flow-of-funds or forecasting ability of
traders; and 3) the existence of risk premia or hedging pressure in futures markets.4
Peck and Leuthold examine the adequacy of futures market speculation using a version of
Working’s speculative index.  The speculative index uses the COT data to quantify speculative
levels (non-commercial positions) relative to hedging needs (commercial positions).  The
forecasting ability of traders is typically examined using a finer version of the CFTC’s large-
trader data set than that released in the COT report.  Hartzmark and Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu use
detailed end-of-day position data for individual traders to evaluate their forecasting ability.
Hartzmark concludes that large traders’ returns are generated randomly; whereas, Leuthold,
Garcia, and Lu find that select traders in frozen pork bellies can profitably forecast prices.  Kahn
uses the COT report to mimic the positions of reporting non-commercial traders.  He finds that
following their positions (upon release of the COT reports) does not generate statistically
significant profits.
Many researchers (e.g., Chang; Bessembinder; Chatrath, Liang, and Song) use the COT data to
test for hedging pressure or risk premia.  Due to changes in the COT reporting frequency and
availability, researchers often make assumptions about traders’ positions.  For instance, Chang
assumes that traders’ commitments are static over a reporting month—the same as they are at the
end of the reporting interval.  This assumption, while perhaps necessary for a cohesive data set,
can potentially bias statistical tests concerning traders’ profitability or forecasting ability.
De Roon, Nijman, and Veld use the COT data to examine hedging pressure in futures markets.
They find strong statistical evidence that hedging pressure impacts futures returns.  They define
hedging pressure as the difference in commercial short and commercial long positions divided by
total commercial positions.  In a regression framework, net short hedging by reporting
commercials is associated with statistically positive futures returns.  In their theoretical model,
the authors assume that there is no quantity risk; thus, the regression results reflect a strictly
contemporaneous relationship.
Researchers utilizing the COT data faithfully take the data at face value: commercials are
hedgers and non-commercials are speculators.  While this may be a safe assumption, a careful
inspection the data collection procedures may aid in its interpretation and use.  In addition,
academic researchers make numerous assumptions about how traders’ positions change or do not
change over reporting intervals.  Often, these assumptions lead to an implicit overlap between
price and position data that may bias conclusions concerning trader profitability, price pressure
effects, or hedging pressure.  In the following sections, we first examine the collection
procedures employed by the CFTC in compiling the COT data, and then we explicitly examine
the lead-lag nature of the data to help interpret prior research results.5
The Large-Trader Reporting System
1
The CFTC is charged with regulating futures and options trading such that the markets are free
from artificial prices.  One of the measures used to accomplish this goal is the CFTC’s market
surveillance program.  The market surveillance program is intended to “spot adverse situations in
futures markets.”  To accomplish this “a market surveillance program must determine when a
trader’s position in a futures market becomes so large relative to other factors that it is capable of
causing prices to no longer accurately reflect legitimate supply and demand conditions” (CFTC,
Number 5-92).   To monitor these situations, the CFTC developed the large-trader reporting
system.  The large trader reporting system collects daily positions (from futures commission
merchants, clearing members, and foreign brokers) for traders that have positions larger than the
reportable level.  The reportable level is defined by the CFTC for a given future (a single
contract month in a commodity market).
2  The reportable level is on a futures-equivalent or delta
adjusted basis.
3  So, a trader may hold contracts in excess of the reportable level, but if the
position is delta-neutral then it is not a reportable position
Each futures account is identified with an “owner” and a “trader”.  The “trader” is an entity who
makes trading decisions or has material financial interest.  For example, a large corporation may
have cattle feeding, grain handling, and investor services divisions.  The overall corporation is
the account “owner,” but each division may be considered a separate “trader.”   A “trader” may
have accounts with a number of futures commission merchants (FCMs).  Positions are
aggregated across accounts controlled by the same entity and those in which the entity has a ten
percent or greater financial interest.
4  Thus, within the context of the COT reports, a “trader” is
any entity that directly controls trading  (i.e., is an “authorized trader”) or has at least a ten
percent financial interest in an account.  A trader’s position is aggregated across all such
accounts.
FCMs file a CFTC Form 102 when an account has a reportable position.  Form 102 provides the
CFTC with preliminary information concerning financial interests and the commercial nature of
the account.  The account trader is required to complete a CFTC Form 40 within ten days of
acquiring a reportable position.  Form 40 collects detailed information on the controlling interest
in the account.  Also, in Form 40, the trader is asked to self-identify as a commercial or non-
commercial.  Where, a commercial is “engaged in business activities hedged by use of the
futures and option markets…this would include production, merchandising or processing of a
cash commodity, asset/liability risk management, security portfolio risk management, etc”
                                                          
1 The following discussion reflects the procedures for reporting large-trader positions as of January 1, 2000.  The
information was taken from publications on the CFTC website as well as personal interviews with the CFTC
surveillance staff.  It is important to note that reporting procedures and requirements have had numerous changes
through time.  Please see the footnotes provided in this paper and the CFTC’s website (www.cftc.gov) for details.
2 As of January 1, 2000, if a trader holds a reportable position in any future, then all of his positions in all futures are
reported.  Previously, only those held in that particular future were recorded.
3 Prior to 1996, traders’ futures and options positions were not combined on a delta equivalent basis.  There were
separate reporting levels for futures and options (CFTC).  The respective exchanges provide the CFTC with the
deltas for adjusting option positions.
4 Exceptions to this rule exist for commodity pool operators (CPOs) where it can be demonstrated that the
commodity trading advisors (CTAs) act independently.6
(CFTC Form 40).  In addition to whether the trader is a commercial or non-commercial, more
detailed data is collected about the trader’s motives.  For instance, non-commercials are asked to
identify themselves as commodity trading advisors (CTAs), commodity pool operators (CPOs),
or floor brokers.  Likewise, commercials are asked to identify the cash markets in which they
have underlying risk and the nature of their commercial business (e.g., producer, processor,
merchandiser, or end-user).  Form 40 is updated every two years or upon special calls by the
CFTC.
The Commitments of Traders Reports
The large-trader reporting system collects detailed daily information on the positions of
reportable traders.  A subset of this data is released to the public through the CFTC’s COT
reports.  Although the CFTC large-trader reporting system contains more detailed information,
the COT report only discloses positions at the commercial versus non-commercial aggregation
level for reporting traders.
From the collection and identification process described above, it seems that the basic
classification of reporting versus non-reporting is relatively clean across traders.  It is unlikely
that there are large measurement errors with respect to position size.  However, this delineation
tells us nothing about the motives of non-reporting traders.  They may be hedgers, speculators, or
market makers.
The disaggregation of reporting traders into commercial versus non-commercial market
participants has potential sources of error.  In particular, “commercial traders” may not always be
hedgers, and hedgers may not always be hedging.  For instance, because of the speculative
position limits placed on non-commercials, there is some incentive for traders to classify
themselves as commercials.  Also, since cash positions for true commercials are unknown, their
positions may be speculative in nature.  Therefore, true hedging positions are some subset of the
commercial traders’ positions.  In total, commercial positions are likely to reflect very diverse
motives.
In contrast, there are no obvious incentives to self-classify as a speculator.  So, reporting non-
commercials most likely represent a relatively pure subset of total speculative positions.  It
would seem particularly difficult for a commodity trading advisor (CTA) to describe themselves
as a commercial; thus, it is likely that reporting non-commercial positions largely reflect those
held by managed funds.
In summary, the trade’s labels of “funds,” “hedgers,” and “small speculators” placed on the
CFTC trader classifications of reporting non-commercials, reporting commercials, and non-
reporting traders, respectively, are at best tenuous.  First, there is no information about the
motives of non-reporting traders.  We only know that they do not hold positions in excess of
CFTC reporting levels.  Second, pure hedge positions are a subset of the reporting commercial
classification, and reporting commercial positions likely reflect a diverse set of motives in
aggregate.  Finally, the “funds” or reporting non-commercials is probably the most precise7
classification, effectively capturing the positions of a sub-set of speculators (i.e., managed
funds).
Position Measurement
Non-commercial open interest is divided into long, short, and spreading; whereas, commercial
and non-reporting open interest is simply divided into long or short.  The following relation
explains how the market’s total open interest (TOI) is disaggregated:
(1) ) ( 2 ] [ ] [ )] ( 2 [
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where, NCL, NCS, and NCSP are non-commercial long, short, and spreading positions,
respectively. CL (CS) represents commercial long (short) positions, and NRL (NRS) are long
(short) positions held by non-reporting traders.  Reporting and non-reporting positions must sum
to the market’s total open interest (TOI), and the number of longs must equal the number of short
positions.
In this research we focus on two relative measures of position size.  The first is simply the
percent of the total open interest held by each CFTC trader classification.  This measure is the
sum of the long and short positions held by the trader class divided by twice the market’s total
open interest.










The second measure captures the net position of the average trader in a CFTC classification.
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The percent net long position (PNL) is calculated as the long minus the short positions divided
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The PNL for each CFTC classification represents the net position held by the group normalized
by their total size.  De Roon, Nijman, and Veld calculate the PNL for reporting commercials and
                                                          
5 This is seen by multiplying through Equation (1) by 1/(2*TOI).  For example, reporting non-commercials’ percent
of total open interest is calculated as [NCL + NCS+2*(NCSP)]/(2*TOI).
6 All of the results in this paper apply to the average trader in each group.  Certainly, there are individual exceptions.8
refer to it as “hedging pressure.”
7   Furthermore, they distinguish between “hedging pressure”
(PNLt) and “price pressure” (∆ PNLt).  Here, we follow Roon, Nijman, and Veld and examine the
behavior and impact of traders’ net positions in both levels and first differences.
Data, Empirical Methods, and Results
Since October of 1992, the COT reports have been issued every other Friday and contain traders’
positions on the previous two Tuesdays.
8  Thus, from October 1992 to present, there is a
continuous weekly (Tuesday-to-Tuesday) time series of traders’ futures positions.  The COT data
is collected on four relatively independent markets: live cattle, corn, natural gas, and crude oil.
9,10
The data is collected weekly from October 6, 1992 through December 28, 1999 for futures only
positions.
11  The COT data reflects traders’ positions as of Tuesday’s close (although it is not
released until Friday).  A matching set of futures returns, Rt = ln(pt/pt-1), are calculated for nearby
futures using Tuesday-to-Tuesday closing prices.  We make no assumptions about how or why
traders’ positions might change over the course of a week, and there is no overlap between the
return series (Rt) and a one lag of the position series PNLt-1.
The first position measure examined is the percent of total open interest held by each CFTC
group as shown in Equation 2.  The summary statistics are presented in Table 1, and Figures 1
and 2 illustrate the measures for live cattle and natural gas.
From Table 1, it is clear that reporting commercial traders are the largest position holders in
these markets.  This is especially true in the natural gas and crude oil markets, where
commercials comprise 70.9% and 67.2% of the total open interest, respectively.  The next largest
group is non-reporting traders.  The smallest group is the reporting non-commercials or “funds.”
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 the relative size of each trader category changes through time.  In
live cattle (Figure 1), the relative proportion of reporting non-commercials has trended higher,
while the proportion of non-reporting traders has declined.  This is also true in natural gas
                                                          
7 Following the naming device presented by De Roon, Nijman, and Veld, the percent net long position held by non-
commercials, 
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−
, would be referred to as “speculative pressure” and that held by non-
reporting traders,
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+
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, as “small trader pressure.”  Note that the PNL for each CFTC classification, when
weighted by their percent of the total market open interest, will sum to zero.
8 The COT reports were issued monthly prior to 1991 and bimonthly from January 1991 to November 1992.  From
1975 through 1991, the data is available monthly.  Prior to 1975, the reports were issued semi-monthly.
9 The only statistically significant correlation among futures returns is between natural gas and crude oil.  The
simple correlation coefficient between these two markets is 0.20.
10 The CFTC reporting level for these markets are 150, 100, 100, and 300 contracts (futures-equivalent),
respectively.
11The “optionized” or futures-equivalent data are available weekly from March of 1995 through December of 1999
(250 observations).  Over this interval, the correlation between futures only and the futures-equivalent positions
were all greater than 0.90 except in natural gas where one was 0.83.  In fact, most of the correlations are greater than
0.95; so, it is unlikely that the combined futures and options data set would produce empirical results markedly
different from those presented for futures only.9
(Figure 2), where reporting non-commercials have tended to become a greater portion of the
market.  The reason for these trends could stem from increases in speculative limits during the
late 1990’s (CFTC) and the general growth in managed futures (see Irwin and Yoshimaru).
The remainder of the analysis focuses on net market positions as measured by the percent net
long (PNL) in Equation 3.  The summary statistics for PNL are presented in Table 2.  Across all
the markets, reporting non-commercials hold net long positions.  Reporting commercials hold net
short positions in each market except corn.  The net position held by non-reporting traders is
mixed.
12
In all instances, the PNL is volatile with each group swinging from net long to net short (except
non-reporting traders in natural gas).  The most volatile group is the reporting non-commercials
where the PNL can reach extremes greater than 50%, either long or short.  The volatility of the
non-commercials’ net positions is clearly illustrated for live cattle and natural gas in Figures 3
and 4.  From this data it is clear that non-commercials, although not a large percent of the total
market, must be active traders who will change from long to short over the course of a week. The
volatility of each category’s net position indirectly reveals information about the diversity of
motives within each group.  It would appear that the least diverse set of motives exist for non-
commercial traders.  In fact, the data suggest that this group largely acts in concert relative to the
other trader groups.  Thus, it is not surprising that they are thought to influence the market. The
next set of tests will help determine whether or not the net position held by any of the trader
categories contain information concerning the future direction of prices.
Before explicitly examining the lead-lag relationships between traders’ positions and market
returns, it is worthwhile to examine the contemporaneous relationships between PNLt and Rt.
The simple correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3, with the upper panel using levels of
PNLt and the lower using first differences, ∆ PNLt.  All of the correlation coefficients in Table 3
are statistically different from zero at the 5% level except for live cattle reporting commercials
(top panel).  The results clearly indicate a strong positive contemporaneous correlation between
the PNL for non-commercials and returns and a strong negative relationship between reporting
commercials and returns.  That is, reporting non-commercials (commercials) increase their long
positions in rising (falling) markets.  This characteristic of the data can support numerous
theoretical results, including hedging pressure by commercials (Roon, Nijman, and Veld) to
positive feedback trading by non-commercials (De Long, Shleifer, and Summers).  Certainly, it
is no surprise that the correlations are opposite since the market on whole must retain a neutral
net position.  Next, we explicitly consider the lead-lag relationship between net positions and
returns.
                                                          
12The position held by non-reporting traders is a residual measure.  It must be the opposite of that held by reporting
traders, which itself is a weighted average of reporting commercial and non-commercial positions.10
Hamilton suggests the direct or bivariate Granger test for examining the lead-lag relationship
between two series.  In Equation (4), the series PNLt is said to lead futures returns, Rt, if they are
useful in predicting Rt.  The null hypothesis that PNLt does not lead Rt, HO: β j=0 ∀ j, is tested
with a Wald chi-squared test.
13
(4) t j t j i t i t PNL R R ε β γ α + + + = − −
The results (p-values) for testing the null that PNLt does not lead Rt are presented in Table 4.  In
the upper panel, percent net long positions (PNL) is measured in levels and in the lower panel it
is measure in first differences.  Looking at the first row in each panel, there is little evidence that
reporting non-commercial or “fund” positions contain any information about futures returns.
That is, we cannot reject the null that positions do not lead returns.  Although the impact is
mostly positive, it is not statistically significant at the 5% level for any market.  One
interpretation of the results in levels is that non-commercials do not establish large long (short)
positions prior to rising (falling) futures prices.  Likewise, the results in first differences suggest
that an increase (decrease) in “funds” net long position does not proceed a market rally (break).
In Table 4, the impact of reporting commercials’ positions is mostly negative across the markets.
But, again, statistical significance is weak.  Only in crude oil can the null hypothesis that net
positions do not lead returns be rejected at the 5% level.  The results for non-reporting traders
have more statistical rejections of the null, but the directional impact is mixed.  For instance, the
null is rejected in corn at the 5% level.  However, in levels the impact is positive; whereas, it is
negative when using ∆ PNL.  Collectively, the results in Table 4 do not suggest that there is a
systematic tendency for any of the trader groups’ positions to lead futures returns.
The null hypothesis that futures returns do not lead trader positions is tested in a Granger
causality framework by estimating Equation (5) and testing the null hypothesis that θ j=0 for all j.
(5) t j t j i t i t R PNL PNL ω θ λ φ + + + = − −
The p-values from the Wald chi-squared test are presented in Table 5.  Again, the upper (lower)
panel presents the result using PNL in levels (first differences).  Here, the results for reporting
non-commercials are consistent.  The null hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels in all
cases, and the impact is uniformly positive.  That is, positive futures returns result in reporting
non-commercials increasing their net long position.  This could be indicative of a class of
positive feedback traders or trend-followers.
                                                          
13 The lag structure (i, j) in equations (3) and (4) are determined by estimating the models for all values of i =
1,2,…8 and j=1,2,…8, and then choosing the model that minimizes Akaike’s information criteria (Beveridge and
Oickle).  The model is tested for serial correlation with a Lagrange multiplier test and heteroskedasticity with
White’s test.  If  there is serial correlation, then additional lags of the independent variable are added until it is
eliminated.  If the model is heteroskedastic, then we utilize White’s heteroskedastic consistent covariance estimator.11
The results for reporting commercials (second row of each panel) are also fairly consistent.  In
levels, the returns statistically lead net positions and the impact is uniformly negative
(commercials increase long positions as prices fall).  This could characterized “value hedgers” or
negative feedback traders who buy (sell) in falling (rising) markets.  Alternatively, this could be
a manifestation of the data constraint that longs must equal shorts.  Where, commercials take the
opposite position of positive feedback non-commercial traders.  The presented results allow for a
wide range of interpretations.
The results are mixed for non-reporting traders in Table 5.  Of the eight tests with the non-
reporting traders, the null is rejected in four tests at the 5% level and the impact is mixed across
the markets.
In summary, the Granger causality tests suggest the following.  First, there is no pervasive
evidence that traders’ percent net long positions (PNL) contain any predictive information about
market returns (equation 4 and Table 4).  Second, there is consistent evidence that positive
(negative) futures returns cause the net long positions held by non-commercial traders to increase
(decrease).  In particular, positive returns in week t-1 result in an increase in the net long
positions held by non-commercials the following week.  Similarly, commercial traders show a
tendency to be net sellers of futures positions the week following an increase in prices.  The
results for non-reporting traders are mixed.  These findings support a wide variety of theoretical
models and interpretations.
Summary and Conclusions
The CFTC collects detailed daily information on the positions held by reporting traders.  A
subset of that information is released to the public in the biweekly COT reports.  A futures
market’s open interest is disaggregated into positions held by reporting and non-reporting
traders, and reporting traders are further identified as commercials or non-commercials.  These
groups are commonly referred to as large speculators (reporting non-commercials), hedgers
(reporting commercials), and small speculators (non-reporting traders).
The collection methodology underlying the COT data leads to the following conclusions.  First,
the data provides no information about non-reporting traders other than they do not hold
positions in excess of reporting levels.  Second, the trading motives in the reporting commercial
classification is likely to extend beyond just hedgers.  That is, pure hedging positions are a subset
of those represented by reporting commercials.  Finally, reporting non-commercials are the
trader category least prone to reporting error.  Since there are no incentives to self-classify as a
speculator, the reporting non-commercial positions likely reflect a pure subset of true speculative
positions.
The empirical analysis focused on traders’ positions in live cattle, corn, natural gas, and crude oil
from 1992 through 1999 (378 weekly observations).  The empirical analysis shows that the
largest positions are held by reporting commercials and the smallest by reporting non-
commercials.  Although a relatively small percent of the total market (between 10 and 23 percent12
for the tested markets), the non-commercials are active traders who may change from extreme
net long positions to extreme net short positions over the course of a week.
The contemporaneous relationship between the percent net long (PNL) for each CFTC trader
class and market returns (Rt) is analyzed.  The results strongly indicate that reporting non-
commercials (commercials) increase their long positions in rising (falling) markets.  The fact that
the non-commercials and commercials show inverse changes in their positions is not surprising,
since longs and shorts must balance.  Importantly, this contemporaneous relationship can support
a number of competing theoretical models (e.g., hedging pressure, positive feedback trading).
The lead-lag relationship between net positions and market returns is analyzed in a Granger
causality framework. There is no consistent evidence that traders’ percent net long positions
(PNL) contain any predictive information about market returns.  However, the results clearly
indicate that positive futures returns precede increases in the net long positions held by reporting
non-commercial traders.  Commercials are net sellers following price increases.
The above findings are important for accurately interpreting prior empirical results.  First, any
research that assumes positions at the end of a time period are the same as those held during the
time period must be carefully evaluated (see Chang; Bessembinder; Catrath, Liang, and Song;
De Roon, Nijman, and Veld).  The contemporaneous correlation between returns and positions
will bias results to suggest that that commercial traders create hedging pressure which results in a
risk premium flowing to non-commercials. Or, it will appear that non-commercials are profitable
traders and commercials are not.  The lead-lag relationships presented in this research shows that
neither group’s positions are systematically useful in predicting returns.  In fact, for both groups,
returns lead positions.  That is, (non-) commercials are net (buyers) sellers the week following an
increase in prices.  It is not clear that the COT data provides any information concerning the
profitability of trader groups
The finding that traders’ positions are not useful in predicting returns is important to
practitioners.  In this analysis, it is assumed that the COT data is available immediately (on
Tuesday).  However, the data is not publicly released until Friday afternoon.  In the interim,
traders’ positions can change dramatically, especially those held by non-commercials.  Thus, it is
even more unlikely that the public release of the data is useful in predicting returns.  However,
our tests certainly do not rule out the possibility that this data can be used in conjunction with
other information to forecast prices.
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Table 1.  Percent of Total Open Interest Held by CFTC Reporting Categories, October
1992 to December, 1999 (378 weekly observations).































aThe average percent of the total open interest held by the CFTC trader category.
bThe minimum and maximum sample values are presented in parentheses (minimum, maximum).
Table 2.  Percent Net Long Held by CFTC Reporting Categories, October 1992 to
December, 1999 (378 weekly observations).






















































aThe average percent net long (PNL), calculated as long minus short positions divided by their sum.  All of the
means are statistically different from zero at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test) except for non-reporting traders in crude
oil.  The series are stationary at the 10% level (Dickey-Fuller test) except for non-reporting corn positions.
bStandard deviation.
cThe minimum and maximum sample values are presented in parentheses (minimum,maximum).16
Table 3.  Contemporaneous Correlation Coefficients Between Futures Returns and Percent
Net Long Positions, October, 1992 to December, 1999 (378 weekly observations).
Levels




a 0.221 0.231 0.287
Reporting
Commercial
-0.059 -0.239 -0.252 -0.324
Differences
Non-Reporting -0.195 0.126 0.149 0.329
Reporting
Non-Commercial
0.447 0.537 0.463 0.519
Reporting
Commercial
-0.289 -0.672 -0.494 -0.560
Non-Reporting -0.388 0.445 0.280 0.431
aSimple correlation coefficients calculated over 378 (377) observations in levels (differences).  Using a two-tailed t-
test, any correlation greater than 0.10 in absolute value is statistically significant at the 5% level.
bThe upper panel presents the results with PNL in levels.  The lower panel presents results using PNL in first
differences.17
Table 4.  Granger Causality Test that Percent Net Long Positions Lead Futures Returns,
October, 1992 to December, 1999 (378 weekly observations).
Levels
















































































































aThe lag structure (i,j) from the OLS regression,  t j t PNL j i t R i t R ε β γ α + − + − + = .
b The p-value from the Wald chi-squared test of the null, β j=0 ∀ j.  Rejection of the null implies that the PNL leads
futures returns, R.
cThe cumulative impact of lagged values of PNL.  The (+) or (-) is the sign of Σβ j, and an asterisk (*) denotes a
rejection of the null that Σβ j=0 at the 5% level (Wald chi-squared test).
dThe upper panel presents the results with PNL in levels.  The lower panel presents results using PNL in first
differences.18
Table 5.  Granger Causality Test that Returns Lead Percent Net Long Positions, October,
1992 to December, 1999 (378 weekly observations).
Levels



























































































































aThe lag structure (i,j) from the OLS regression,  t j t R j i t PNL i t PNL ω θ λ φ + − + − + = .  is estimated for percent
net long (both PNL and ∆ PNL) and returns, R, for each market and trader category.
bThe p-value from the Wald chi-squared test of the null, θ j=0 ∀ j.  Rejection of the null implies that that returns, R,
lead traders’ positions, PNL.
cThe cumulative impact of lagged values of PNL.  The (+) or (-) is the sign of Σθ j, and an asterisk (*) denotes a
rejection of the null that Σθβ j=0 at the 5% level (Wald chi-squared test).
dThe upper panel presents the results with PNL in levels.  The lower panel presents results using PNL in first
differences.19
Figure 1.  Live Cattle Futures, Proportion of Total Open Interest Held by CFTC Trader
























































Reporting, Non-commercials Reporting, Commercials Non-reporting
Figure 2.  Natural Gas Futures, Proportion of Total Open Interest Held by CFTC Trader




























































Reporting, Non-commercials Reporting, Commercials Non-reporting20
Figure 3.  Live Cattle Futures, Percent Net Long by CFTC Trader Classification, October,



































































Reporting, Non-commercials Reporting, Commercials Non-reporting
Figure 4.  Natural Gas Futures, Percent Net Long by CFTC Trader Classification,
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